WHITE VOTERS ARE DIFFERENT: HOW THE RACIALIZATION OF POVERTY CONTRIBUTES TO REPUBLICAN PARTY SUPPORT AMONG LOW-TO-WORKING-CLASS WHITE VOTERS

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ABSTRACT

In the past 60 years, the number of low-to-working class White voters who have deserted the Democratic Party and instead support Republican candidates has steadily increased. Low-to-working-class Americans of other races have not abandoned the Democratic Party in comparable ways, and this shift did not occur among White Americans in other income groups. This increase is unexplained by religious mobilization or other prominent cultural wedge issues. This study evaluates the extent to which low-to-working-class White American voters' partisan shift is explained by the racialization of poverty. Using the American National Election Study Cumulative Data File, I evaluate the relationships between straight-ticket Republican voting, White low-to-working-class socioeconomic membership, and attitudes toward Black people for the general election years between 1948 and 2016. I find that the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is nearly five times higher for low-to-working-class White voters, lower for those who have positive feelings toward people on welfare, and over six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder to succeed. Additionally, the likelihood of believing that Black people must try harder to succeed is nearly two times higher for low-to-working-class White voters and nearly eight times higher for people who vote straight-ticket Republican. These analyses reveal clear positive relationships between White voters' perceptions of the links between race and poverty and their support for Republican political candidates and policies.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Partisan loyalties vary by income group. In the United States, Republican politicians historically benefit from the support of upper-class and wealthy Americans, and Democratic politicians tend to draw more support from low-income, working-class, and middle-class Americans. In order to attract and retain the loyalty of high-income voters, Republican politicians run on pro-business and pro-tax cut platforms, and Democrats run on platforms that emphasize civil rights, greater income equality, and health care to communicate their commitment to voters with lower incomes. The benefits of Republican policies accrue primarily to the wealthy and the benefits of Democratic policies accrue primarily to low- to working-class groups.

Voters choose to support candidates for many reasons, but their reasons are often tied to challenges or issues that voters face in their own lives. Over the past forty years, economic inequality has risen to unprecedented rates, and the disappearance of the middle class has resulted in more Americans slipping into lower income percentiles and fewer rising above the middle-class threshold. Themes of declining economic opportunity dominate American politics today. If there is a link between voters' economic self-interest and their voting behavior, it would follow that low-to-working-class voters (defined as those with income levels below the 33rd household income percentile) of all backgrounds overwhelmingly vote for Democratic candidates. This relationship is true for the majority of low-SES voters, regardless of all other characteristics. However, over the past 50 years, a significant number of low-to-working-class White voters have turned from primarily supporting Democratic candidates to supporting Republican candidates. The extent of this shift was apparent in the 2016 election, in which the

proportion of low-to-working-class White voters who voted for Donald Trump in 2016 rose above the proportion of low-to-working-class voters who voted for Barack Obama in 2012. This economically self-defeating behavior contradicts the historic trend of economically disadvantaged voters factoring their financial struggles in their voting decisions and consequently supporting Democrats. Today's economically disadvantaged White voters are different from those of the past.

The fact that the racial distinctions among low-to-working-class voters' shift in partisan support have occurred only in the past 50 years indicates that events that occurred during this timeframe may explain these changes in. Since the 1960's, beliefs about race and poverty have dramatically changed in the Democratic and Republican parties and among White voters of different income groups, and these changes are underexplored factors that may explain the self-adverse voting behavior of White people in the low-to-working-class income groups. These events include the expansion of welfare programs and the ability of demographic groups deemed less "deserving" to access those benefits, the unprecedented success of the Republican politician Barry Goldwater in states in the Deep South, the evolution of the Republican Party's use of coded racial appeals in response to Goldwater's success, and academics' uncritical acceptance and proliferation of stereotypes about the relationship between poverty and race following the publication of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's report *The Negro Family: The Case For National Action*, also known as the Moynihan Report. Poverty and race became strongly linked in the minds of the American public following these events. Low-to-working-class White voters responded to this messaging that encouraged them to think of themselves as unique among

demographic groups, and they became increasingly supportive of Republican politicians, whose economic policies did nothing to advance the economic position of their income groups.

This study will address the question, "Do the low-SES White voters who vote for Republican candidates do so because they subscribe to a racialized view of poverty?" I perform logit and logistic regressions on the American National Election Survey Cumulative Data File, which consists of pooled data collected between 1948 and 2016, to assess relationships between attitudes about race, poverty, and voting behavior.

CHAPTER II: PRIOR STUDIES

Literature Review

Debates persist over which considerations are most important to voters when they decide which political candidate or political party to support. Religious ideology, educational attainment, gender, and geography are examples of factors that influence voters' partisan leanings and ultimate voting behavior and have been studied extensively in the past century. Perhaps unexpectedly, economic factors, which shape nearly every aspect of daily life, have only recently been incorporated into the literature that examines the important drivers of Americans' support for political parties and voting tendencies.

Initially, analyses of economically motivated voting focused on American macroeconomic health, and gross domestic product (GDP) is most commonly used as a measure of macroeconomic health. Macroeconomic prosperity tends to benefit candidates belonging to the same political party as the incumbent president, and economic downturns benefit opposition party candidates (Kinder and Kieweit 1988). However, this relationship does not always hold. The 2016 election illustrates the failings of this theory. Barack Obama guided the nation through an economic comeback, and GDP rose by 16.6% over his two terms as president. However, neither the economic comeback nor the GDP growth that occurred during his presidency ensured a victory for the 2016 Democratic candidate for president, Hillary Clinton, nor did it secure a Democratic majority in either branch of the 115th United States Congress. The macroeconomic model of voting may no longer hold because GDP and personal incomes have become increasingly divergent since the 1980s (Stiglitz 2013). Income growth today lags far behind GDP

growth.[a] A macroeconomic model of voting that relies on GDP as a representative measure of national economic health also fails to capture the economic situations of individual voters in different demographic and income groups.

The pocketbook voting model addresses gaps in the macroeconomic model by considering the relationship between voters' personal economic experiences and their voting behavior (Kinder and Kieweit 1981). Individual voters understand their own day-to-day financial situations more completely than they understand the status of the nation's economic health. Voters may hear news of GDP growth and not understand what that means for their economic prospects, but they can look at their pay stubs and easily know whether their incomes are growing. However, the strength of pocketbook concerns in voters' ultimate voting behavior is unclear, especially when social issues, religious ideology, gender, and race are also factored into the decision-making process.

Today, economic inequality is endemic, and it has been worsening for decades. In 2019, the top 20 percent of all income earners in the United States owned 77 percent of all wealth in the United States, the middle 60 percent owned 20 percent of all wealth, and the bottom 20 percent owned 2 percent of all wealth (Sawhill and Pulliam 2019). In contrast, the top 20 percent of income earners in 1983 owned 73 percent of all wealth, the bottom 80 percent owned 17 percent of wealth, and the top 20 percent of income earners in 1963 owned 70 percent of all wealth (McKernan et al. 2017). As a consequence of the Great Recession, median wealth in the United States declined for all income groups, save the top 10 percent of income earners, and low

[a] From January 2019 to December 2019, personal income in the United States grew by 0.3% and GDP grew by 2.3% (https://www.bea.gov/news/glance).

income and minority households endured disproportionately large losses in wealth and income (Pfeffer et al. 2014).

The income gap has widened in a similar manner. Between 1963 and 2016, private family income[b] grew by almost 92 percent for the top decile of Americans, while it increased by less than nine percent for the bottom decile (McKernan et al. 2017). The share of national income that goes to the top 0.01 percent in the United States— now roughly 16,000 families—increased by four percentage points from 1980 to 2013, while the median household income fell during that period (Stiglitz 2013). These disparities are no accident. Rather, they are the consequence of decades of tax cuts, tax exemptions, rent-seeking behavior and regulatory capture guided by the financial sector and other industry giants, all of which favor the wealthiest Americans at the expense of those who fall at and below the middle class (Stiglitz 2013). Additionally, the family poverty rate has risen during the first term of Republican presidents and fallen during the first term of Democratic presidents for most presidents elected since 1960 (U.S. Census Bureau).[c]

Because politicians recognize that economic concerns resonate with voters of all backgrounds, particularly with low-to-middle-class Americans, most include economic and welfare policy tools in their campaign platforms. Democrats tend to favor programs that help Americans weather unexpected financial crises, policies that strengthen regulatory oversight to prevent abuses by employers and financial institutions, and financial assistance programs that help families and individuals afford educational, housing, and medical expenses. Republicans

[b] "Income" was defined by McKernan et al. as earnings and dividends, as well as cash government benefits.
[c] There are two exceptions to this trend. The family poverty rate increased by 1.5 percentage points during the first term of President Barack Obama. President Obama's administration inherited the economic recession that began during the second term of President George W. Bush. Additionally, the family poverty rate was the same in the first and last years of President Ronald Reagan's first term.

favor market solutions, deregulation, and tax expenditures to address Americans' economic situations. Additionally, conservative politicians persist in proclaiming that America is a land of opportunity despite the decades-long trend of worsening economic mobility and accelerating income inequality (Stiglitz 2013). Conservatives also continue to embrace the "trickle-down economics" theory, which holds that the only intervening role that government should have in the free market is allocating tax cuts to high-wealth individuals and corporations, which, they claim, leads to job creation and higher wages that benefit working-class and low-income Americans (Stiglitz 2013). Neither of these claims have been substantiated; in fact, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 Tax incentivized corporate buybacks and shareholder payouts, not higher wages for workers. Analysis by the Tax Policy Center reveals that 83 percent the tax cuts resulting from this legislation will be allocated to the top 1 percent of households by 2027 (Milani et al. 2019).

The belief that low-to-working-class voters should support the Democratic Party but overwhelmingly support Republican candidates is partially flawed (Glas et al. 2016). The majority of low-to-working-class voters of all races support Democratic candidates, but in the past five decades, an increasing number of low-to-working-class White voters, particularly White working-class men, have turned from primarily supporting Democratic candidates to primarily supporting Republican candidates (Adair 2001; Glas et al. 2016). However, the number of low-to-working-class White voters who consistently vote for Republican candidates does not surpass the number of low-to-working-class White voters who support Democratic candidates (Glas et al. 2016). Additionally, the trend in increased Republican support among this demographic group is unexplained by religious mobilization or salient cultural wedge issues

(Brady et al. 2009). Something about the low-to middle-class White support for Republicans is distinctive.

Because the shift in partisan support among low-to-working-class voters occurred among White voters only in the past 50 years, it is likely that changes in perceptions about race and poverty contributed to this shift. Welfare programs were largely disregarded by the public in the years between 1935 and the mid-1960s, and poverty was not believed to be exclusive to any one demographic group (Haney-Lopez 2014; Heclo 2001). The modern welfare state created by the Social Security Act of 1935 primarily benefitted "deserving" families and individuals, who were predominantly White (Heclo 2001; Davies & Derthick 1997). "Deserving" individuals included people who were blind, destitute elderly people, and mothers (predominantly widows) raising children (Heclo 2001).

Widows received stipends through the Aid to Dependent Children program (ADC, later Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)), which policymakers intentionally designed to enable impoverished widows to remain at home with their children, just as well-off widows did (Orloff 1988; Heclo 2001). However, as higher numbers of women and African Americans became eligible for federal welfare programs in the years between 1935 and the 1960s, perceptions about the worthiness of welfare beneficiaries changed. The ADC program became increasingly scrutinized during the late 1950s and early 1960s and this scrutiny increased after President Lyndon Johnson announced the launch of the War on Poverty in January 1964 (Gilens 1999). Under the War on Poverty welfare program expansions, ADC mothers were no longer predominantly widows. Increasingly, the mothers were divorced, deserted, or unmarried women, both Black and White, who were not deemed "deserving" of social assistance by politicians or

the public (Heclo 2001). The War on Poverty also opened the door for the racialized portrayals of poverty that became increasingly common in academia, politics, and journalism in the following decades (Gilens 1999).

Following the Johnson Administration's expansion of federal welfare programs, Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote a report called *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, alternatively known as the "Moynihan Report." Moynihan wrote this report to convince White House officials that civil rights legislation alone would not satisfactorily bring about racial equality in the United States (Geary 2015). Moynihan wrote that the root of racial inequality and generational poverty in America was the African American family structure, particularly the Black, single-mother-headed family. The paper relied on the idea that personal pathologies cause generational inequality, which he labeled a "culture of poverty" (Geary 2015; Heclo 2001; Moynihan 1965). He claimed that chaos and instability in African American communities were caused by illegitimacy and desertion and that government assistance was powerless to change generational poverty in the face of the repeated perverse actions of Black mothers and fathers (Haney-Lopez 2014; Moynihan 1965).

Moynihan was not incorrect about the economic inequalities experienced by Black communities. A persistent relationship between race and poverty existed in the United States, even as the nation's economy grew and overall inequality decreased (Paden 2011). However, in opting for a "personal pathologies" explanation for abiding poverty, Moynihan failed to acknowledge the effects of government-sanctioned policies such as Black Codes and redlining that perpetuated persistent poverty among African American communities (Averbeck 2018; Haney-Lopez 2014; Paden 2011). A lasting consequence of this report is a policy framing device

that characterizes poverty as a consequence of families' and groups' "culture of poverty," not federal policy choices or institutional discrimination. The theme that government programs and interventions are incapable of improving the lives of poor African Americans due to culture was expanded by conservatives, who downplayed the long-term effects of structural racism and neglect and blame government programs for creating cultural pathologies in low-income minority communities (Haney-Lopez 2014).

Another reason that poverty became increasingly associated with race lies in civil rights groups' decision to classify poverty as a civil rights issue and attributed the relationship between race and poverty to white supremacy. While no civil rights group shaped its policy response to the War on Poverty in terms of the Moynihan Report, few vocally condemned its contents (Paden 2011). This lack of vehement condemnation by the leaders of the movement functioned as an implicit acknowledgement of the veracity of the Moynihan Report. The lack of early critical response to Moynihan's assertations made the report more acceptable to scholars, who, to the detriment of the Black community, accepted, disseminated, and expanded on the report.

Republican politicians' gradual embrace of dog-whistle rhetoric in campaign messaging is another factor that contributed to realignment of low-to-working-class White voters from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. On average, Democrats and Republicans had roughly the same positions on racial justice and poverty alleviation policies prior to 1960 (Caro 1984). There were regional differences in the motivations of the Democratic constituency region prior to the 1960s, but low-to-working-class White voters overwhelmingly supported Democratic candidates. Democratic politicians in the North attracted the support of low- to middle-class White voters because of their progressive positions on labor and social justice that were closely

tied to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal policies (Caro 1984). Democratic politicians in the South were conservative on racial issues and used their seniority in Congress to ensure that civil rights legislation did not pass Congress and that their White constituents would maintain economic and political control of the South (Caro 1984). However, the parties' positions on racial justice and poverty alleviation began to change around the time that the Civil Right Movement gained momentum. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson ushered in a new era of Democratic politics, in which they moved the Party to the left very quickly on social and racial equality. Liberals in the Democratic Party leadership responded to these Presidents' priorities and these social movements, and the Party as a whole became far more supportive of anti-poverty policies and racial equality than conservative Democrats liked (Haney-Lopez 2014; Caro 1984). Strom Thurmond epitomized the Southern Democrats' distaste with these changes by defecting from the Democratic Party and joining the Republican Party in 1964.

Republican support among White voters began to surge in the 1960's with the ascent of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater mastered the technique of stoking racial tensions by incorporating coded, stereotype-enforcing racial appeals, known as a "dog-whistles," into his messaging tactics (Haney-Lopez 2014). Goldwater was inspired by George Wallace, a lifelong Democrat, who held moderate views on civil rights and segregation early in his political career but realized after losing the 1958 race for governor of Alabama that blatant racism had been the key to his opponent's victory (Haney-Lopez 2014). Shifting course, Wallace adopted a hardline segregationist position and incorporated dog-whistle phrases such as "welfare cheats," "law and order," and "states' rights," into his speeches when he ran for governor again in 1962. This strategy worked, and he served as Governor of Alabama for a total of 16 years. Goldwater, a

Republican Senator from Arizona, embraced and honed Wallace's messaging tactics when he ran on the Republican ticket for President in 1964 and became the first Republican to win states in the Deep South since Reconstruction. Republican political aides and consultants took note of Goldwater's surprising success in the South and began to systematize and disseminate strategies for incorporating dog whistles into political messaging to realign conservative White voters in the South to the increasingly conservative Republican party (Haney-Lopez 2014). While President, Richard Nixon encouraged his staff in their creation of a "Southern Strategy" that solidified the Republican Party's support in historically Democratic Southern states. Goldwater's and Nixon's dog-whistle tactics occurred in contests for the highest political office in the United States and pushed the Republican party into a more conservative direction overall, but especially as pertained to civil rights. These tactics encouraged both hostility toward non-White Americans and a general feeling among these politicians' supporters of the overall superiority of White Americans who were "law-abiding," did not "cheat" the welfare system, and recognized that "states' rights" were of greater priority than the federal government's policy preferences and mandates (Haney-Lopez 2014).

Encouraged by the success of coded racial appeals in Goldwater's and Nixon's messaging strategies, Republicans who were disillusioned with their consistent defeats in congressional races and were unhappy with the fast pace of social change also began to promote the narrative that declines in living standards were due to useless government spending, especially on social safety net programs such as ADC (Heclo 2001; Teixeira and Rogers 1990). By the early 1970s, welfare programs were widely believed to benefit only minorities (Haney-Lopez 2014; Heclo 2001). White people today tend to view low-SES people who receive

government benefits as "cutting in line" and "wasting hard-earned tax dollars," despite the fact that Black people never comprised more than one-third of the United States' welfare rolls (Hoschild 2017; Heclo 2001). Because the Democratic Party has been viewed as the party of the poor people and of African Americans since the 1960s political realignment, Democrats are strongly linked with social programs and are consequently demonized as the architects of inefficient and obtrusive programs that result in higher taxes for middle-class workers (Teixeira and Rogers 1990; Gilens 1999). Voters had only to listen to politicians' arguments to know that Democrats were, on average, far more supportive of government spending and racial equality than Republicans (Carmines and Stinson 1989). By using dog-whistle rhetoric, Republican politicians encouraged the narrative that declines in standards of living and higher economic inequality are the consequence of wasteful expenditures and tend to blame the social welfare programs championed by Democrats for the declines in overall economic mobility (Teixeira and Rogers 1990). Also worthy of mention is the fact that the rise in White support for Republican politicians coincided with the steady decline in income security for low-to-working-class White Americans that began in the 1990s. As White Americans' financial situations and economic prospects increasingly relegate them to lower income percentiles, they respond by becoming more supportive of Republican politicians.

The media also played a consequential role in the racialization of poverty. Media coverage of poverty in the early 1960s tended to be neutral in tone and accompanied by pictures of White people, but by 1967 newsmagazine stories on poverty were accompanied by pictures of Black people 72 percent of the time (Gilens 1999). Media stories on poverty published in the following decades increasingly focused on Black families, despite a national decline in the

overall poverty rate (Heclo 2001; Gilens 1999). These stories were sympathetic toward White families in poverty and associated African American families in the same financial circumstances with all of the objectionable aspects of poverty (Gilens 1999). Nearly thirty years after the rise of dog-whistle rhetoric and the Moynihan Report's publication, the public continued to grossly overestimate the percentage of African Americans living in poverty (Gilens 1999). In 1991, the poverty rate for African Americans was 29 percent, yet the median response to the question "What percent of all the poor people in this country would you say are black?" was 50 percent (Gilens 1999). This statistic reflects the lasting impacts of widespread dissemination of stereotypes about the relationship between race and poverty in America, and can explain low-income White Americans' attraction to politicians who use dog-whistle rhetoric. The racialization of poverty helps explain low-income White Americans' increasingly negative response to people on welfare, despite the fact that White people are overwhelmingly the largest group welfare program beneficiaries in the United States (Gilens 1999).

The combined effects of the federal government's expansion of welfare and entitlements programs, Civil Rights Movements organizations' identification of poverty as a civil rights issue Moynihan's explicit blaming of impoverished Black families for their economic struggles, and Republican politicians' decision to use facially race-neutral rhetoric to communicate stereotypes about minority groups and garner White support collectively solidified the perception that to be poor was to be Black (Gilens 1999; Carmines and Stinson 1989; Paden 2011; Averbeck 2018).

Hypotheses

I contend that the racialization of poverty occurred due to the dissemination of the ideas in the Moynihan Report in academic spheres and Republican politicians' incorporation of coded messaging strategies into their political communications. I hypothesize membership in the low-to-working-class White sociodemographic group is predictive of straight-ticket Republican voting behavior and is predictive of subscription to coded racial appeals, controlling for demographic characteristics, educational attainment, and attitudes regarding race and poverty. I further hypothesize that agreement with coded racial appeals is predictive of straight-ticket Republican voting behavior and of membership in the White low-to-working-class sociodemographic group, with controls for demographic characteristics and educational attainment.

CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODS

Data and Analysis Sample

The investigation of political behavior over time requires a robust national data set that measures many variables, including variables that measure political attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics over time. I use the American National Election Studies ("ANES") cumulative data file, which consists of pooled cross-section surveys and variables from select questions from the ANES time-series studies conducted from 1948 to 2016. The ANES cumulative data file is a nationally representative sample of 59,944 respondents that were selected as part of relatively small samples and were interviewed before and after every presidential election that occurred between 1948 and 2016. The studies ask the same questions every year, and when new questions are added to the survey in response to social and political changes, they are also asked every year following their addition. Respondents self-report answers, which indicates that the raw data may not accurately represent the respondents' demographics or attitudes.

Key Dependent Variables

Republican Vote- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent voted straight-ticket Republican for candidates running for Congress, the Senate, and the Presidency in general election years between 1952 and 2016 and 0 if they voted any other way. This variable is used as a dependent variable in an analysis that examines the relationship between partisan voting behavior and demographic and socioeconomic variables and as an independent variable in a model that examines the relationship between demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and agreement with dog-whistles.

Blacks Must Work Harder- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent agrees with the statement "Black people must work harder to succeed" and zero if the respondent disagrees with this statement. This control variable is included to identify a relationship between support for Republican politicians and attitudes about Black people's work ethic, which is a placeholder for racist attitudes toward Black people. This variable also captures a coded racial appeal, or a dog whistle, in agreement with the statement indicates acceptance of the idea that Black people are responsible for their own struggles, and that responsibility does not lie in the structural policy decisions or in the consequences of white supremacy. This variable is used as an independent variable in an analysis that examines the relationship between acceptance of dog-whistles and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and as a dependent variable in a model that examines the relationship between partisan voting behavior and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.

Key Explanatory Variables

White Low-to-Working-Class- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent is White and the respondent's self-reported income falls below the 34th percentile of household income for all survey years, and zero if the respondent is non-White and if their income is at or above the 34th percentile of household income for all survey years. This control variable is included in order to explore the correlation between economic class, race, and support for Republican politicians.

Additional Control Variables

Feeling Thermometer- Black People- an ordinal variable that takes values between zero and 100, with 50 indicating neutrality toward the group identified. In feeling thermometer questions, a respondent who feels very warmly and feels absolutely no negative feelings toward the group identified will respond with the value 100 and a respondent who feels very coldly and has only the most negative feelings toward the group identified will respond with the value zero. This control variable is included to identify whether a negative relationship exists between support for Republican politicians and self-reported feelings of warmth toward Black people.

Feeling Thermometer- People on Welfare- an ordinal variable that takes values between zero and 100, with 50 indicating neutrality toward the group identified. In feeling thermometer questions, a respondent who feels very warmly and has absolutely no negative feelings toward the group identified will respond with the value 100 and a respondent who feels very coldly and has only the most negative feelings toward the group identified will respond with the value zero. This control variable is included to identify whether a negative relationship exists between support for Republican politicians and self-reported feelings of warmth toward people on welfare. As described in the literature review, people overestimate the number of people on welfare that are Black, and this variable acts as an alternate way for respondents to reveal their attitudes toward a group widely assumed to be predominantly Black. It is included to determine if respondents' replies to the term "Black people" deviates from their replies to "people on welfare." If differences exist, it is likely due to response bias and not due to a truly higher level of approval toward Black people compared to people on welfare.

Male- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent is male and zero if the respondent is female or has another gender identity. This control variable is included due to the correlation between gender and support for Republican politicians.

Age Over 54- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent is over the age of 54 and zero if the respondent is 54 or younger. This control variable is included due to the correlation between age and support for Republican politicians.

South- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent lives in the South as defined by Census regions and zero if the respondent lives in any other Census region. This control variable is included due to the correlation between geography and support for Republican politicians.

Employed- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent it employed and zero if the respondent is not employed. This control variable is included to explore the correlation between any level of income and support for Republican politicians.

High School- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent attained any level of high school education and zero if the respondent received less than or more than a high school education. This control variable is included due to the relationship between education and support for Republican politicians.

Some College- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent attended but did not graduate from college and zero if the respondent did not attend college, if the respondent graduated from college, or the respondent attained an advanced degree. This control variable is included due to the relationship between education and support for Republican politicians.

College or Advanced Degree- an indicator variable that takes the value one if the respondent graduated from college or obtained an advanced degree and zero if the respondent received did not graduate from college or obtain an advanced degree. This control variable is included due to the relationship between education and support for Republican politicians.

Means and standard deviations of all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 10.

Data Limitations

The data are limited in a few aspects. Some variables are not present for all survey years. Feeling Thermometer questions were first used in 1972, so it is not possible to analyze changes in attitudes for all years for which the survey was csonducted. Questions about cultural and social concerns are written as the nation gains widespread awareness of the issues. For example, feeling thermometer questions were first used in the 1970s, so there is no data regarding voters' average warmth toward certain groups or concepts prior to 1970. Therefore, I have to rely on the literature to understand attitudes toward social issues or groups prior to the years in which those questions were introduced. Additionally, while the ANES data is representative nationally, it may not be representative for smaller demographic groups for which there may be fewer respondents.

Methods

Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy

I use the American National Election Studies ("ANES") cumulative data file, which consists of pooled cross-section surveys and variables from select questions from the ANES time-series studies conducted from 1948 to 2016. The ANES cumulative data file is a nationally representative sample of 59,944 respondents that were selected as part of relatively small samples and were interviewed before and after every presidential election that occurred between 1948 and 2016. After adjusting for demographic characteristics, the largest sample size used in this study is 1,042 and the smallest sample size is 799.

To examine the relationships between low-to-working-class income level and straight-ticket Republican voting behavior, defined as voting for a Republican candidate in the presidential, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives races in general election years, I conduct dichotomous logistic regression analyses using Stata. The coefficients indicate through their signs whether the relationships between the dependent or independent variables are direct or inverse, while the odds ratios compare one group to another when the other correlates for voting behavior are held constant. Odd ratios of 1.0 indicates no difference, ratios above 1.0 indicates positive difference, and ratios below 1.0 indicates a negative difference between the independent variable and dependent variable of interest. I use "svy" commands into account for complex sampling designs in my analyses.

Results

Tables 2 and 3 show that low- to working-class White voters predominantly tend to support the presidential candidate who ultimately wins the general election. Low-to-working-class White voters do not always support Democrats, and in all but four general elections (1956, 1984, 2000, and 2008), the presidential candidate that the majority of low-to middle-class White voters supported was elected to office. The low-to-working-class vote allocated toward Democratic presidential candidates was at its highest in the years preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act, as shown in Table 3. The enormous advantage that the Democratic candidate received from the low-to-working-class White vote in the 1964 election has not been replicated since. Additionally, the average White low-to-working-class vote for Democrats in the five elections between 1952 and the Civil Rights Act was 53 percent for Democrats and 47 percent for Republicans. 1964 was the first year since Reconstruction that a Republican presidential candidate carried states in the Deep South. In the elections following 1964, low-to-working-class White voters' support for Democratic candidates waned, as illustrated in Figure 1. Between 1976 and 1992, the low- to working-class White vote allocated to both parties' candidates hovered between 60 and 40 percent. With the exception of 2008, the low- to-working class White electorate has demonstrably allocated an increasingly higher percentage of their votes to Republican presidential candidates since the 1996 election. Since the 2000 general election, the average White low-to-working-class vote for Democrats equals 41 percent, compared to 59 percent for Republicans.

Table 4 captures the change over time in White voters' average party identification. I did not estimate effects for low-to middle-class White voters due to small sample sizes of this subset

of the population for all but one (2016) survey year. Survey respondents' self-reported party identification is a categorical variable in which "Democratic Party" and "leans Democratic" is given the numeric value one, "Independent" is given the numeric value two, and "Republican Party" and "leans Republican" is given the numeric value three. Therefore, the higher the average response value for a given demographic group, the more likely it is that more members of the group self-identify as either Independent or Republican. Table 4 reveals that White voters in all income groups became more conservative between 1972 and 2012, with the exception of the wealthiest five percent of White voters. Over this forty-year period, low-income and middle-class voters steadily moved away from self-identifying as Democrats, in contrast with voters in other income groups, who displayed more irregular shifts in party identification over that period, as demonstrated in Figure 2.

The level of warmth felt toward certain groups by White voters of all income groups is documented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. On average, survey respondents in all years feel less warmly toward people on welfare than they feel toward Black people or poor people, shown in Table 5. Over time, the two lowest income groups have reported the largest average decrease in warmth toward people on welfare of all White voters. Respondents self-reported feeling more warmly, on average, toward Black people than toward people on welfare. While all White voters fluctuated over time in average self-reported warmth, average warmth toward Black people reported by White voters in lowest income group was lower in 2016 than it was in 1972, whereas White voters in every other income group reported more warmth toward Black people in 2016 than in 1972. Additionally, Table 6 demonstrates that, on average, people are unwilling to self-report a warmth toward Black people that is lower than the neutral value of 50, while they are

willing to report low warmth scores toward people on welfare. While the literature documents the interchangeability of "Black people" and "people on welfare" in Republican political communications and in some media outlets, both terms were included in this study to determine whether there is a difference in average self-reported warmth toward these two groups. The difference in warmth toward these groups may be due to response bias, in which the respondent felt pressure to give socially acceptable answers, and not reflect respondents' average true feelings of warmth toward the groups. Table 7 reveals that, on average, White voters of all income groups report warmer feelings in response to the group "poor people" than they do toward "Black people" or "people on welfare." However, every income group has reported decreased average warmth toward poor people over time. This variable is included in the analysis to determine whether it is poverty alone that or other ideas about the people who are impoverished that influence low-to-working-class White voters' electoral choices.

Model 1 of Table 8 is a limited model with controls for race, low- to working-class income groups, feelings about Black people, feelings about people on welfare, and the belief that Black people are not trying hard enough. This model reveals that the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is nearly five times higher for White low-to-working-class voters, nearly six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder, and two percent lower for those who feel warmly toward people on welfare. There is no difference between straight-ticket Republican and straight-ticket Democratic voters in the warmth felt in response to the feeling thermometer variable "Black people." The second model, which controls for gender and age in addition to the variables included in Model 1, again finds that the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is nearly five times greater for White low-to-working-class voters, two

percent lower for those who feel warmly toward people on welfare, and nearly six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder. There are no differences in outcome by gender, age, or in the feeling thermometer response to "Black people" in this model. Controlling for employment status in addition to the previously included variables, the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is just under five times higher for White low-to-working-class voters, nearly six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder, and two percent lower for those who feel warmly toward people on welfare. This model reveals no significant differences in voting straight-ticket Republican by gender, age, employment status, or in the feeling thermometer response to "Black people." When controlling for Census region in Model 4, the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is over five higher for White low-to-working-class voters, nearly six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder, and two percent lower for those who feel warmly toward people on welfare. There is no difference in the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican according to gender, age, geography, employment status, or in the feeling thermometer response to "Black people" in this model. Model 5 reveals that the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is nearly six times greater for White low-to-working-class voters, two percent lower for those who feel warmly toward people on welfare, and over six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder. There is no significant difference in the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican by educational attainment, gender, age, geography, employment status, or in the feeling thermometer response to "Black people" in this model. In sum, these models reveal that White low-to-working-class voters are extremely likely to vote for Republican candidates and that, while people who vote straight-ticket Republican do not reveal negative feelings toward

Black people nor have an opinion of people on welfare that is very different from non-straight-ticket-Republican voters, they are extremely likely to agree with coded racial appeals.

Table 9 shows the relationship between agreement with the statement "Black people must try harder to succeed" and demographic, political, and educational characteristics. The statement is a coded racial appeal which acknowledges that Black people struggle, but blames them for their struggles rather than acknowledging the role of political structures or white supremacy in Black peoples' socioeconomic difficulties. The limited Model 1, which controls for gender, low-to-working-class White voter status, and straight-ticket Republican voting status, reveals that the likelihood of agreeing with the aforementioned statement is nearly seven times higher for straight-ticket Republican voters and nearly two times higher for low-to-working-class White voters. Model 2 includes controls for gender, low-to-working-class White voter status, age, and straight-ticket Republican voting status, and reveals the same information as the first model. Model 3 controls for gender, low-to-working-class White voter status, age, geography, and straight-ticket Republican voting status, and also reveals that White low-to-working-class voters are nearly two times more likely to agree with the statement and that straight-ticket Republican voters are nearly seven times more likely to agree with the statement. The fourth model, which controls for gender, low-to-working-class White voter status, age, geography, employment status, and straight-ticket Republican voting status, reveals the same information as the previous models. The last model controls for gender, low-to-working-class White voter status, age, geography, employment status, educational attainment, and straight-ticket Republican voting status reveals that White low-to-working-class voters are less likely than revealed in previous models to agree with the statement, that straight-ticket Republican voters are nearly eight times

more likely to agree with the statement, that people with at least some college education are 86 percent less likely to agree with the statement, and that people who have completed college or have an advanced degree are 94 percent less likely to agree with the statement compared to those with lower levels of education. Overall, these analyses reveal that low-to-working-class White voters and straight-ticket Republican voters are extremely likely to agree with coded racial appeals.

Conclusions

The multivariate results revealed that being poor and White is strongly predictive of a straight-ticket Republican vote, which may be indirectly related to subscription to coded racial appeals. Additionally, this association holds up when controlling for White low-to-working-class membership, age, geography, employment status, gender, and attitudes toward Black people and people widely assumed to be Black. Clear positive relationships were evidenced between poor White voters' perceptions of the links between race and poverty and their support for Republican political candidates and policies. For example, the likelihood of voting straight-ticket Republican is nearly six times greater for White low-to-working-class voters, two percent lower for those who feel warmly toward people on welfare, and over six times higher for those who believe that Black people must try harder.

The multivariate results also reveal that agreement with prejudiced views regarding Black people's work ethic is strongly predictive of a straight-ticket Republican vote and membership in the White low-to-working-class sociodemographic group. When controlling for gender, low-to-working-class White voter status, age, geography, employment status, educational attainment,

and straight-ticket Republican voting, the results show that White low-to-working-class voters are nearly two times more likely to agree with the statement that "Black people must try harder to succeed" and that straight-ticket Republican voters are nearly eight times more likely to agree with the statement.

It is possible that the links between low-to-working-class White people's voting preferences and sentiments about Black people are partially fueled by racist ill will, but also by negligence and passivity on the part of good-faith political actors. The dog whistle framing devices used by segregationist Democrats in the South and gradually embraced by Republican politicians throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the dissemination of Daniel Moynihan's victim-blaming report, its embrace by academics, and the media's role in making such associations common and accessible to all Americans were the backdrop against which the partisan leanings of the White low-to-working-class socio-demographic group and this group's understanding of its economic prospects relative to other groups took hold.

While these analyses reveal strong relationships between partisan voting, race, and income, they do suggest the necessity for more research to unravel the complex relationships between the racialization of poverty and voting. Further studies could examine the changes over time in partisan behavior among low-to-working-class White voters to determine the strength of the relationship between membership in this sociodemographic group and the aforementioned events that contributed to the racialization of poverty.

Table Shells

Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation for Analysis Variables

Analysis Variables	Mean	Standard deviation
Voting behavior = Republican	0.13	0.34
Voting behavior = Democrat	0.16	0.37
Male	0.48	0.5
Race: White Non-Hispanic	0.79	0.41
Race: Black Non-Hispanic	0.12	0.32
Race: Other	0.09	0.29
Age Over 54	0.56	0.5
Census Region: Northeast	0.18	0.39
Census Region: North Central	0.33	0.47
Census Region: South	0.29	0.45
Census Region: West	0.2	0.39
Low- to Working-Class	0.28	0..45
Respondent is Working	0.58	0.49
Educational Attainment: Grade School	0	0
Educational Attainment: High School	0.3	0.46
Educational Attainment: Some College	0.33	0.47
Educational Attainment: Bachelor's or Advanced Degree	0.38	0.48
Feeling Thermometer: People on Welfare	51.26	21.71
Feeling Thermometer: Black People	65.55	20.91
Black People are Lazy	0.47	0.5
Political affiliation (3 categories)	1.84	0.92
Year	1985.44	19.44

Table 2: Percent Low-to-Working-Class White Vote for President by Party, Pre-Civil Rights Act

Presidential Candidate Party	General Election Year				
	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964
Republican	38%	58%	58%	55%	21%
Democrat	62%	42%	42%	45%	69%

* Blue indicates the years in which the Democratic candidate won the presidential election and red indicates the years in which the Republican candidate won the presidential election.

Table 3: Percent White Low-to-Working-Class Vote for President by Party, Post-Civil Rights Act

Presidential Candidate Party	General Election Year												
	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Republican	59%	68%	47%	56%	47%	57%	40%	34%	48%	51%	48%	53%	61%
Democrat	41%	32%	53%	44%	53%	43%	60%	66%	52%	49%	52%	47%	39%

* Blue indicates the years in which the Democratic candidate won the presidential election and red indicates the years in which the Republican candidate won the presidential election.



Figure 1: Percent White Low-to-Working-Class Vote for President by Party in General Election Years since 1952

Table 4: White Voters' Average Party Identification Ranking by Income Group for General Election Years

White Voters' Average Party Identification where 1= Democrat, 2 = Independent, 3 = Republican	Year of Study										
	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
0-16th percentile	1.77	1.87	1.72	1.74	2.02	1.84	1.66	1.65	2.08	1.79	1.94
17th -33rd percentile	1.84	1.78	1.78	2.01	1.98	1.95	1.8	1.89	2.09	1.94	2.05
34th to 67th percentile	1.8	1.91	2.08	2.02	2.01	1.93	1.9	1.94	2.26	2.08	2.07
68th to 95th percentile	2	1.97	2.12	2.25	2.25	2.18	2.23	1.98	2.18	2.43	2.13
96th-100th percentile	2.32	2.51	2.36	2.47	2.7	2.23	2.44	2.33	2.22	2.78	2.12



Figure 2: White Voters' Shift in Party Identification since 1972

* Categorical Variable Response Options for Figure 2: Democratic = 1 | Independent = 2 | Republican = 3

Table 5: White Voters' Average Feelings of Warmth Toward People on Welfare by Income Group for General Election Years

White Voters' Mean Feeling Thermometer Response to "People on Welfare" by Income Group	General Election Year									
	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
0-16th percentile	56	55	58	48	49	51	57	63	58	49
17th -33rd percentile	55	54	54	52	51	51	56	57	57	50
34th to 67th percentile	48	49	52	47	52	50	51	53	50	44
68th to 95th percentile	47	45	51	47	47	48	49	50	51	45
96th-100th percentile	43	43	50	45	45	49	54	50	48	46

Table 6: White Voters' Average Feelings of Warmth Toward Black People by Income Group for General Election Years

White Voters' Mean Feeling Thermometer Response to "Black People" by Income Group	General Election Year										
	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
0-16th percentile	65	62	63	65	56	63	63	71	73	69	62
17th -33rd percentile	60	61	63	59	62	63	66	68	70	68	63
34th to 67th percentile	62	59	61	62	60	64	65	64	71	66	63
68th to 95th percentile	62	58	59	65	59	62	63	68	67	67	65
96th-100th percentile	58	60	61	63	59	60	65	68	70	65	63

Table 7: White Voters' Average Feelings of Warmth Toward Poor People by Income Group for General Election Years

White Voters' Mean Feeling Thermometer Response to "Poor People" by Income Group	General Election Year										
	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
0-16th percentile	78	74	74	78	66	72	67	70	82	75	67
17th -33rd percentile	74	75	74	71	73	70	71	71	71	74	70
34th to 67th percentile	72	69	73	71	67	69	68	67	73	70	67
68th to 95th percentile	71	66	71	71	63	66	67	68	67	68	64
96th-100th percentile	67	69	66	69	66	64	60	72	69	73	64

Table 8: Odds Ratios for Logistic Models Predicting Straight-Ticket Republican Vote

	Vote for Republican Candidate				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	A. Odds Ratios				
Demographic					
White low-to-working-class voter	4.65***	4.88***	4.94***	5.38***	5.94***
Male	—	1.22	1.22	1.32	1.29
Age Over 54	—	0.92	0.94	0.93	0.96
South	—	—	—	1.5	1.51
Socioeconomic					
Employed	—	—	1.06	1.08	1.04
Educational Attainment					
High school	—	—	—	—	0.36
Some college	—	—	—	—	0.49
College or Advanced Degree	—	—	—	—	0.57
Political Attitudes					
Feeling Thermometer-Black People	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Feeling Thermometer-People on Welfare	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
Blacks Must Try Harder to Succeed	5.71***	5.85***	5.85***	5.63***	6.19***
	B. Coefficients				
Demographic					
White low-to-working-class voter	1.53***	1.58***	1.6***	1.68***	1.78***
Male	—	0.2	0.2	0.27	0.35
Age Over 54	—	-0.09	-0.07	-0.07	-0.03
South	—	—	—	0.41	0.41
Socioeconomic					
Employed	—	—	0.06	0.08	0.03
Educational Attainment					
High school	—	—	—	—	-1.02
Some college	—	—	—	—	-0.7
College or Advanced Degree	—	—	—	—	0.57
Political Attitudes					
Feeling Thermometer-Black People	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
Feeling Thermometer-People on Welfare	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
Blacks Must Try Harder to Succeed	1.74***	1.77***	1.77***	1.73***	1.82***

N=799

Table 9: Odds Ratios for Logistic Models Predicting Agreement that Black People Must Try Harder to Succeed

Belief that Black People Must Try Harder to Succeed

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
			A. Odds Ratios		
Voting Behavior					
Straight-ticket Republican vote	6.9***	6.9***	6.74***	6.73***	7.59***
Demographic					
White low-to-working-class voter	1.86***	1.85**	1.97***	1.98***	1.67*
Male	0.9	0.9	0.94	0.94	0.88
Age Over 54	—	1.02	1.01	1.03	0.94
South	—	—	1.37	1.38	1.39
Socioeconomic					
Employed	—	—	—	1.04	1.2
Educational Attainment					
High school	—	—	—	—	0.27
Some college	—	—	—	—	0.14*
College or Advanced Degree	—	—	—	—	0.06**
			B. Coefficients		
Voting Behavior					
Straight-ticket Republican vote	1.93***	1.93***	1.91***	1.91***	2.03***
Demographic					
White low-to-working-class voter	0.62***	0.61**	0.68***	0.68***	0.51*
Male	-0.11	-0.1	-0.06	-0.06	-0.12
Age Over 54	—	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.06
South	—	—	0.32	0.32	0.33
Socioeconomic					
Employed	—	—	—	0.04	0.18
Educational Attainment					
High school	—	—	—	—	-1.31
Some college	—	—	—	—	-1.95*
College or Advanced Degree	—	—	—	—	-2.79**

N=1,042

Appendix

Table 10: Coding of Variables Used in Analysis

Concept	Operational Definition	Raw Variables	Transformation/ Recode	Analysis Variable	Description
Voting behavior	Three categorical variables which indicate whether respondent voted D or R for Congressman, Senator, or President	VCF0707 (Vote for Congressman- D or R) VCF0704a (Vote for President- Major Parties) VCF0708 (Vote for Senator- D or R)	Generate new variable rvote: rvote =1 if VCF0707==2 & VCF0704a ==2 & VCF0708==2 and rvote = 0 if VCF0707 !=2 & VCF0704a !=2 & VCF0708 !=2	rvote	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent voted straight ticket Democrat and 0 if respondent voted straight ticket Republican
Race	Respondent is White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, or Other	VCF0106 (Race-ethnicity summary, 3 categories)	Generate new dummy variable for each racial group	whitenh blacknh other	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent's race is White non-Hispanic/Black non-Hispanic/Other and coded 0 if region is not White non-Hispanic/Black non-Hispanic/Other
Gender	Bivariate variable- respondent is a man or a woman	VCF0104 (Respondent — Gender)	Generate new dummy variable male: male = 1 if VCF0104 == 1 and male = 0 if VCF0104 == 2	male	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent is a man and coded 0 if respondent is a woman
Age Group	Age group of respondents	VCF0102 (Respondent - Age Group)	Generate new dummy variable over54: over54= 1 if VCF0102 >= 4 and Over54 = 0 if VCF0102 <4	over54	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent is over the age of 54 and 0 if respondent is younger than 54
Census Regions Northeast North Central South West	Respondent's Residence by Census Region	VCF0112 (Region - U.S. Census)	Generate four new dummy variables corresponding to each of the Census regions	northeast ncentral south west	Dummy variable coded 1 if the region is Northeast/North Central/South/West and coded 0 if region is not Northeast/North Central/South/West
Low-to-working-class income level	Income percentile as determined by respondent's total income	VCF0114	Generate new dummy variable lowtoworking: lowtoworking= 1 if VCF0114 <3 and = 0 if VCF0114 >=3	lowtoworking	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent's income level is below the 33rd percentile, 0 if higher than 33rd percentile

Employment status	Bivariate variable indicating whether respondent is employed	VCF0116	Generate new dummy variable working: working = 1 if VCF0116 == 1 and working = 0 if VCF0116 != 1	working	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent is working and coded 0 if they fall into any other categories of employment (laid off, retired, unemployed, disabled, homemaker, student)
Education level	Less than high school, high school degree, some college, college or advanced degree	VCF0140 (Respondent - Education 6-category)	Generate four new dummy variables corresponding to level of educational attainment	gradeschool highschool somecollege collegeoradvanceddeg	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent's education level is grade school/high school/some college/bachelor's or advanced degree and coded 0 if otherwise
Feeling Thermometer: Poor people	How warmly respondent self-reports feeling toward poor people	VCF0223	Rename FTPoorPeople	FTPoorPeople	—
Feeling Thermometer: People on welfare	How warmly respondent self-reports feeling toward people on welfare	VCF0220	Rename FTPeopleOnWelfare	FTPeopleOnWefare	—
Feeling Thermometer: Black people	How warmly respondent self-reports feeling toward black people	VCF0206	Rename FTBlackPeople	FTBlackPeople	—
Black people must work harder to succeed	Categorical variable where 1 is agree strongly and 5 is disagree strongly	VCF9041	Generate dummy variable blacksmusttry: blacksmusttry = 0 if VCF9041>=4 and blacksmusttry = 1 if VCF9041<=2	blacksmusttry	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondent agreed strongly/agreed somewhat that Black people must try harder to succeed and 0 if otherwise
Year	Year of study	VCF0004 (Year of study (4-digit))	—	—	—
Weight Variable	Weight for combined sample for cumulative data file	VCF0009z	—	—	—

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